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Abstract 
Major countermeasures in the late phase of a nuclear or radiological accident where long-lived radionuclides have 
been dispersed in the environment are relocation/resettlement, foodstuff restrictions, agricultural countermeasures 
and cleanup of contaminated areas. A short overview of late phase countermeasures is given together with the rec-
ommendations from the international radiation protection organisations ICRP, IAEA and from the EU on the levels 
of their introduction. The derivation of these intervention levels is briefly addressed. 
Decisions on late phase countermeasures include factors or attributes describing benefits from the coun-
termeasure and those describing harm. In analysing the inputs to the decision, it is necessary to decide on the 
relative importance of each factor. Although there has essentially been a broad acceptance internationally of the 
principles for intervention, it has not been possible to reach agreement for the purpose of defining a net benefit 
based upon the exact weighting to be attached to each of the attributes influencing the decision to take a protec-
tive action. Major attributes would include those related to radiological protection, and those related to social and 
psychological issues. Some of these attributes are discussed in the paper and the role of radiation protection in 
the final decision-making process is elaborated in some detail. 
It is concluded that optimisation of the overall health protection is not a question of developing radiation 
protection philosophy to fully include socio-psychological factors. It is rather a question of including these fac-
tors - in parallel with the radiological protection factors - in cooperation between radiation protection experts and 
e.g. experts in social and psychological sciences under the responsibility of the decision-maker. The overall op-
timisation of the total health protection, i.e. the final decision on the introduction of long-term countermeasures 
is therefore the sole responsibility of the decision-maker. It is further concluded that it seems to be an illusory 
goal to arrive at internationally accepted intervention levels based on an “optimisation” of overall health protec-
tion, which includes all the relevant radiological protection and non-radiological protection attributes. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past 15 years, the Chernobyl and Goiânia accidents resulted in extensive post-emergency phase 
response. Large amounts of 137Cs were released to the environment during these accidents, leading to 
a prolonged or quasi-prolonged exposure of the affected populations. The experience gained from 
these accidents and others have revealed that there is a need for an updated and fully complete system 
of decision-making on implementation of long-term countermeasures. 
 An important aim of late phase protective actions is to reduce the likely numbers of cancers as 
much and as effectively as reasonably possible. However, the total health consequences from long-
term exposure situations, and of any countermeasures subsequently implemented, include more than 
the injuries and increased risks directly attributable to radiation exposure. Stressors, such as the per-
ception of the hazard posed by radiation in the environment and enforced changes of lifestyle, may 
lead to increases in psychological strain in the effected population. Such increases may in turn lead di-
rectly or indirectly to increased illness. 
 
2 LATE PHASE INTERVENTIONS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
A nuclear accident is normally divided into three phases: a pre-release phase with a time scale of 
hours/days, a release phase with a time scale of hours/days and a post-release phase with a time scale 
of weeks/months/years, depending on the nature of the release. Protective actions to be taken with the 
purpose of averting radiation exposure from atmospheric releases of radioactive materials are often 
divided into precautionary, urgent and longer-term protective actions, relating to the three phases of 
the accident. The emergency phase of a nuclear accident covers the pre-release phase, the release 
phase and part of the post-release phase. Similarly, a radiological accident is normally divided into 
two phases: an emergency phase with a time scale of hours/days and a post-emergency phase with a 
time scale of weeks/months/years. The phases of nuclear and radiological accidents are illustrated in 
Fig. 1. 
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Figure 1. Time phases for introduction of protective actions and protective measures in a radiological 
(left-hand picture) and a nuclear (right-hand picture) emergency. The longer-term or late phase pro-
tective measures are introduced in the post-emergency phase based on measurements. 
In the post-release phase it is expected that a reasonably complete picture of radiation and contamina-
tion levels and affected areas in the environment become available. In this phase the dominant risks 
originate from radioactive materials deposited on the ground, mainly from external exposure and in-
gestion of contaminated foodstuffs, and to a minor degree from inhalation exposure from radioactive 
materials resuspended in the air. Measured surface contamination density can thus be used to estimate 
doses from both the external and ingestion exposure pathways and can therefore be used to make de-
cisions about the introduction of countermeasures The major countermeasures in the late phase of an 
accident are relocation/resettlement, foodstuff restrictions, agricultural countermeasures and cleanup of 
contaminated land. 
 
2.1 Relocation and resettlement 
Relocation refers to the removal of people from the area affected by an accident for a longer period of 
time (weeks, months or years) to avert exposures from radioactive material deposited on the ground. 
Relocation and evacuation are fundamentally different actions. In an evacuation the expectation is that 
people will in general return within a few days, and the accommodation will be of a temporary nature, 
often in schools or other public buildings. In the case of relocation there is no intention for people to 
return quickly but rather within months or even years. A distinction can be made between temporary 
relocation, when a return to the affected area is foreseen within a reasonable time, and permanent 
resettlement, when return to the area is not expected. 
 
2.1.1 Temporary relocation 
Temporary relocation means the movement of people from their homes (or from emergency evacuation 
centres) to live in temporary accommodation for a period of several months or more. The measure 
would be taken to prevent radiation exposures from deposited radioactive material, the dose rate being 
expected to decrease over the period, either naturally or due to decontamination measures. Although 
there is some time available for the decision on temporary relocation, values for triggering this measure 
should nevertheless be included in the emergency plans, since they are also needed for the decision on 
whether people who have been urgently evacuated can return to their homes. The physical risks 
associated with temporary relocation are relatively small compared with, say, those for evacuation, since 
the action can be carried out in a controlled and safe manner. However, the upheaval may cause 
psychological harm to relocated individuals. 
 
2.1.2 Permanent resettlement 
It may be the case that, although temporary relocation is deemed unnecessary, residual lifetime doses 
might be high enough to warrant a permanent resettlement elsewhere. The resettlement criterion can be 
expressed as the dose averted for the rest of an individual’s lifetime. In addition to this criterion for 
permanent resettlement based on avertable dose, there is a limit to the period of any temporary 
relocation that can normally be tolerated. The maximum length of this period is dependent on many 
social and economic factors. Purely economic considerations indicate that continuing temporary 
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relocation costs will begin to exceed permanent resettlement costs between about one and five years. 
However, social factors, whether increasing discontent with the temporary accommodation and possible 
related health problems or rather the need to establish settled social patterns, would indicate that the 
period of temporary relocation should be no more than a year or so. 
 
2.2 Foodstuff interventions 
After an accident, the levels of contamination in foods will vary markedly according to many factors, 
e.g. the type of food, the physical and biological half-lives of the radionuclides, soil types, agricultural 
practices, etc. It is useful to distinguish between two different types of countermeasures, namely food-
stuff restrictions/withdrawal and agricultural countermeasures. 
 
2.2.1 Foodstuff restrictions 
Withdrawal and substitution of contaminated foodstuffs is a disruptive action. Intervention levels for 
this countermeasure can be developed according to the principles of justification and optimisation. 
Where alternative food supplies are readily available, the requirement that banning of foodstuffs be 
justified is easily satisfied. The major inputs to the selection of these intervention levels would be the 
collective doses that would be averted per unit mass of foodstuffs and the value placed on the food by 
society. The need to build and maintain public confidence would also be a major concern in the deci-
sion-making process. 
 
2.2.2 Foodstuff countermeasures 
The use of more sophisticated agro-technical measures to reduce the levels in food still further than ex-
pressed by the intervention levels for banning foodstuffs should be considered. Techniques include the 
washing of fruit and leafy vegetables and the removal of outer leaves and surfaces of crops to remove 
surface contamination. Other techniques include the alteration of agricultural practices, for example ad-
ministering Prussian Blue to livestock to reduce radio-caesium in animal products, the feeding of live-
stock with uncontaminated feed for a few weeks before slaughter, and growing different crops grown on 
contaminated soil. Storage of suitable foods can significantly reduce contamination by short-lived ra-
dionuclides. 
 
2.3 Cleanup of contaminated areas 
Decontamination is, in general, a less disruptive protective measure than long-term closure of areas 
because, after the cleanup process is completed, some activities can resume. Its purpose is to reduce the 
external irradiation from deposited activity, reduce the transfer of radioactive material to humans, 
animals and foodstuffs, and reduce the potential for resuspension and spread of radioactive material. 
 The effectiveness of decontamination in urban areas depends on a number of factors. Generally, 
the effectiveness is greater the sooner the decontamination operation is started, as time tends to increase 
the adhesion of contaminants to surfaces by physical and chemical forces. A wide variety of techniques 
have been investigated for the cleanup of all types of materials, buildings, equipment and lands, e.g. 
ploughing, removal of surface soil, and physical and chemical separation of radionuclides from soil. 
 The cleanup of large contaminated areas could be very costly and cause inconvenience to the 
public. The costs of loading, transport and disposal of wastes arising from the cleanup of large con-
taminated areas will be a significant fraction of the total decontamination costs. 
 
3 RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION CRITERIA FOR LATE PHASE INTERVENTIONS 
Intervention is required to reduce the existing radiation exposure in a de facto situation that is judged 
to be unsatisfactory from the point of view of radiological protection as is the situation in the late or 
post-emergency phase of a nuclear or radiological accident. The principles of the System of Radio-
logical Protection for intervention are the justification of intervention and the optimisation of protec-
tive measures. The intervention will achieve an averted dose and a residual post-intervention dose will 
remain. If the protective actions to avert individual doses have been optimised, the post-intervention 
dose is not subject to further dose reductions. 
The ICRP [8] is recommending generic reference levels for intervention and these levels can be 
expressed in terms of the existing total annual dose. These reference levels should be seen as a conse-
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quential derivation from the existing ICRP principles and as complementary to these principles. They 
are particular useful for interventions against exposures to high natural background radiation, for in-
terventions against exposures to radioactive residues from past activities and for interventions against 
exposures from long-lived radionuclides in the environment from nuclear or radiological accidents. 
The generic reference levels should, however, not prevent protective actions from being taken to re-
duce dominant components of the existing total annual dose. The ICRP as well as other international 
organisations [3, 4, 5] recommends specific reference levels (intervention levels) in terms of avertable 
(individual or collective) dose or derived quantities (e.g. Bq/kg)) for specific late phase countermea-
sures as shown in Table 1. The specific reference levels or intervention levels are generally derived 
from a generic optimisation in which the only attributes are dose reduction and monetary costs [3, 4]. 
Table 1. Recommended late phase intervention criteria from international organisations. IAEA crite-
ria for withdrawal of foodstuffs are grouped in category I (fresh milk, vegetables, grain, fruit) and 
category II (meat, milk products). The indicated IAEA criteria for withdrawal of foodstuffs are valid 
for 137Cs- like radionuclides (group 1). The intervention criteria for other nuclide groups e.g. 90Sr 
(group 2) and 239Pu (group 3) are a factor of 10 and 100 lower, respectively. 
Late phase 
Countermeasure ICRP [3] IAEA [2, 4, 9] EU [5, 6] 
Temporary relocation > 10 mSv in a month 
> 30 mSv in first month 
> 10 mSv in subsequent 
months 
> 10 mSv in a month 
Permanent resettlement > 1 Sv in lifetime (70 years) > 1 Sv in lifetime (70 years) > 1 Sv in lifetime (70 years) 
Foodstuff withdrawal 
> 10 mSv in 1 year 
for a single foodstuff 
> 1,000 - 10,000 Bq/kg (β) 
> 10 - 100 Bq/kg (α) 
> 1,000 - 10,000 Bq/kg (I) 
> 10,000 - 100,000 Bq/kg (II) 
maximum permissible levels 
of radionuclides in foodstuffs 
close to the Codex Alimen-
tarius Commission values 
Agricultural 
countermeasures  
generic action levels selected 
from mid-ranges of optimised 
intervention levels to be iden-
tical to the Codex values 
 
Cleanup of contami-
nated land 
total dose reference level of 
10 mSv/a 
cleanup based on optimised 
level of avertable dose 
total dose reference level of 
10 mSv/a 
cleanup based on optimised 
level of avertable dose 
 
Generically optimised action levels for foodstuffs are shown in Table 2 [2, 4]. These values have been 
selected in general towards the middle of each range of optimised action levels and they have 
deliberately been given the same numerical values as those recommended by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission [7] for concentrations of activity in foodstuffs moving in international trade. The levels in 
Table 2 are strictly action levels since they are not for any specific countermeasure, nor are they 
expressed in terms of an avertable quantity. Consistency and simplicity in application and 
compatibility with the guidance of the Codex Aliementarius Commission were important 
considerations in the selection of specific values. 
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Table 2. Generic action levels for foodstuffs from the BSS and IAEA [2, 4]. These action levels are iden-
tical to the recommended guideline levels from the Codex Alimentarius Commission [7]. 
Recommended Action Levels (Bq⋅kg−1) 
Radionuclides Foods destined for general consumption 
Milk, Infant foods 
and Drinking Water 
 134,137Cs, 103,106Ru, 89Sr 1,000 
 131I  
1,000 
 90Sr 100 
100 
 241Am, 238,239Pu 10 1 
The EU Council has adopted maximum permissible levels for four radionuclide groups in four major 
food groups as shown in Table 3 [6]. The maximum permissible levels in each nuclide group were 
derived with considerable safety margins and can therefore be applied independently of the other 
groups. 
Table 3. Maximum permitted levels from "Council Regulation (Euratom) No. 3954/87 of 22/12/1987 
laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and of feeding stuffs 
following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency" [6]. 
Radionuclide group Baby Food 
Dairy 
products 
Other 
foodstuffs 
Liquid 
food 
Feeding 
stuffs 
Isotopes of strontium, notably 90Sr 75 125 750 125 - 
Isotopes of iodine, notably 131I 150 500 2,000 500 - 
α-emitting isotopes of plutonium and trans- 
plutonium elements, notably 239Pu and 
241Am 
1 20 80 20 - 
All other nuclides with half-life greater than 
10 days, notably 134Cs and 137Cs 400 1,000 1,250 1,000 
Pig: 1250 
Poultry: 2500 
Others: 5000 
The levels in Table 3 will apply to the placing on the market in the event of any future accident. They 
will be entered into force by a regulation of the European Commission. The validity of such a regulation 
will be limited to three months, during which another regulation will be prepared. The pre-established 
level in Table 3 will then be adjusted if necessary to take into consideration the circumstances of the par-
ticular accident. 
The current scientific consensus on radiation protection is based on objective assessments of 
the health risks associated with radiation exposure and on radiological protection attributes of various 
exposure situations. It should, however, be recognised that this consensus on recommendations of ra-
diation protection should be seen as a decision-aiding tool, and that these recommendations would be 
used as input to a final decision-making process, which may include other societal concerns and con-
siderations. 
 
4 DECISION-MAKING ON LATE PHASE INTERVENTIONS 
In many intervention situations there are considerations, which may not be objectively related to ra-
diological protection that may also need to be taken into account in making decisions about interven-
tion. ICRP consider that these other considerations, which are mainly of a socio-political and cultural 
nature, may be taken into account in a decision-making process which should be wider than the deci-
sion-aiding process for the justification of intervention as all relevant attributes are included, not only 
radiological protection attributes. 
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4.1 Radiological protection attributes 
Radiological protection attributes are defined as those, which are related to the level of radiological 
protection achieved and they have been used in developing international numerical guidance on inter-
vention levels for implementing countermeasures to reduce doses after a nuclear or radiological emer-
gency [2, 3, 4]. Thus they include those attributes describing the dose distribution averted and those 
describing the costs incurred in averting the doses. All these techniques have as their primary objec-
tive to clarify, for the people who have to decide on the intervention, the various attributes, to quantify 
them if this is reasonable and necessary, and to systematize the trade offs between the various attrib-
utes. 
Attributes, which would clearly be radiological protection related, include those describing 
benefits from the countermeasure and those describing harm: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the averted individual and collective radiation risks for the members of the public, 
the individual and collective radiation risks to the workers in carrying out the countermeasure, 
and 
the monetary cost of the countermeasure. 
 
4.2 Non-radiological protection attributes 
Non-radiological protection attributes are defined as those, which are not related to the level of radio-
logical protection achieved by protective measures. It is very difficult to generalize about these attrib-
utes, although they can have an important or even overriding influence on the decisions taken. 
Most intervention is disruptive to normal social and economic life. Change may cause anxi-
ety, which can be harmful to health and well-being. However, the absence of protective measures can 
also cause anxiety, which is often exacerbated by a lack of objective information. These effects are 
non-radiological, are not easily quantifiable, will vary markedly between countries, and in any case 
will normally have opposing influences on the choices of intervention levels. They include the follow-
ing attributes: 
the individual and collective physical risks to the public caused by the countermeasure, 
the perception of the hazard posed by the radiation from environmental dispersed radioactive 
materials, 
psychological impacts,  
the reassurance provided by the implementation of the countermeasure, 
the anxiety caused by its implementation, 
the individual and social disruption resulting from its implementation, and 
political considerations. 
Although some of these attributes to a certain extent are related to the level of protection achieved 
they are all considered to be non-radiological protection attributes. The political input, however, is 
always deemed to include only non-radiological protection attributes. 
 
4.3 The role of radiological protection in decision-making 
Management of protective actions in existing exposure situations is not a radiological protection prob-
lem only, which was experienced in the former USSR following the Chernobyl accident. The socio-
psychological attributes are important and may in some cases be dominating. Socio-psychological 
countermeasures are a new category of action, in the sense that social protection philosophy has not 
yet been developed to fully include their application in such situations, especially those following nu-
clear or radiological accidents. 
 Without the introduction of protective actions, most attributes would quantify disadvantages, 
e.g. the existing individual and collective doses. The advantage of intervention is that it may reduce 
the disadvantageous attributes, for instance averting individual and collective doses, or even get rid of 
them. Intervention may also introduce advantageous attributes, such us the reassurance produced by 
the intervention. But intervention will in addition introduce new disadvantageous attributes, e.g. the 
costs, harm and inconveniences introduced by the protective actions. 
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Figure 2. Optimisation vis a vis sub-optimisation of overall health protection. The right-hand picture 
shows that when radiation and non-radiation protection is optimised separately, the overall health 
protection might be sub-optimised. Therefore, to achieve an optimised overall health protection, all 
factors should enter the optimisation (decision-making) process in parallel at the outset. 
Explicit guidance is not provided on how psychological, social and other non-radiological attributes 
should be included in the optimisation of the overall health protection of the affected population. 
However, the optimisation of radiation protection and psychological and social protection should not 
be carried out independently, as the overall health protection would depend on both radiological and 
non-radiological protection attributes as shown in Fig. 2. Combining independent optimisations of ra-
diological and non-radiological protection might lead to a sub-optimised overall health protection as 
indicated. 
 
5 OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS 
Many intervention situations are integrated into the human habitat and the ICRP anticipates that the 
decision-making process will include the participation of relevant stakeholders, rather than radiologi-
cal protection specialists alone. Such a process may take account of attributes other than those directly 
related to radiological protection. The objective is that those concerned with the situation should be 
involved and be given the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. This is especially 
important in long-term intervention after an accident and, in particular, in the definition of normality 
of the situation. During more than a decade these issues have been discussed within the radiation pro-
tection community and elsewhere and some observations from these discussions are given below. 
(1) It has been claimed, that there has been a tendency for the radiation protection community to 
try and take the leading role in every situation where radiation protection has a role to play, 
even when radiation protection issues rarely would be the most important. 
(2) In line herewith, members of the radiation protection community, when being criticized for 
including some of the non-radiological attributes in generic optimisation of protective actions, 
have argued that “if we don’t, nobody will”, i.e. that societal aspects should be integrated in 
radiation protection. 
(3) It has been argued that issuing generic numerical guidance on intervention from the interna-
tional radiation protection organisations is highly questionable, because the inclusion of other 
factors in the decision-making process probably would modify the generic levels and because 
those using the generic levels might pay no attention to the various caveats on their deriva-
tion. 
(4) Strong arguments have been put forward on the importance and usefulness of gaining wide 
acceptance of intervention levels and international agencies are encouraged to do so, as dif-
ferences between countries could undermine national policies and become the source of much 
public and political concern and disruption following an accident. 
(5) The experience gained after the Chernobyl and Goiânia accidents and elsewhere shows that 
major differences exist between generic intervention levels developed internationally and the 
actual levels used in post accident management. Dose limits for practices and even lower le-
vels have been used as intervention levels, and it has been argued that this is fully in accord 
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with the principles of intervention if all relevant protection attributes have been given due 
weight in the decision-making process. It has also been argued that in the longer term after an 
accident, it is reasonable for the population to demand the application of the same standards 
of protection as the rest of the (unaffected) population. 
(6) The involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process in post accident management 
have increasingly been explored over the last decade by the radiation protection community, 
especially within the NEA/OECD and lately also in the preparation of the upcoming general 
recommendations from ICRP [10]. 
Each of these observations are addressed and elaborated upon, in particular from the viewpoints of ra-
diation protection and the role of radiation protection in post accident management of a nuclear or 
radiological emergency. 
(ad 1) This observation, how plausible it ever may sound, tends to overlook that the radiation protec-
tion community only acts when radiation is involved and then only on radiation protection is-
sues. More seriously, for radiation protection issues to be “rarely the most important”, pre-
supposes that it is possible to weigh the different non-radiological protection attributes against 
the radiological protection attributes, which still is not possible due to lack of both methodol-
ogy and data. Therefore, the claim that the radiation community try to take the leading role 
whenever radiation protection has a role to play and that radiation protection issues rarely are 
the most important is loosely founded. 
(ad 2) This observation is more straightforward. The inclusion of all relevant attributes into the deci-
sion-making process could never be the preserve of one or another technical community, it is 
solely the role of the decision-maker with inputs from the relevant parts of society, including 
inputs from the radiation protection community as indicated in the figure below. Experts in 
radiation protection or any other experts are not decision-makers and, consequently, the right-
hand picture should form the basis for decisions in post accident management. 
OR?
Integrating societal aspects
into
radiation protection decisions
Integrating radiation protection
into
societal decisions
 
(ad 3) This observation on the issuing of numerical guidance on intervention levels from interna-
tional organisations seems to neglect that it is of utmost importance that societies without a 
strong radiation protection infrastructure needs numerical guidance that can be used for quick 
decisions which are not far off an “optimum” radiation protection solution. As one of the ma-
jor stakeholders in the decision-making process, the radiation protection community has an 
obligation to recommend generic levels from a radiation protection point of view. Even if 
these generic levels probably will be altered in a final decision-making process, such altera-
tions can go in both directions, not only towards intervention levels lower than the generic 
ones. 
(ad 4) The observation on the importance of gaining wide international acceptance of intervention 
levels to avoid any undermining of national policies that could result in public and political 
concern and disruption after an accident is fully appreciated. However, the different protec-
tion attributes entering the decision-making process are not all independent, in some cases 
they even strongly depend on each other. For instance, the level of socio-psychological im-
pact would depend not only on the presence of radiation but to a large extent on other factors 
such as the attitude of the mass media, the political climate and the general level of informa-
tion in the population. It seems therefore to be illusory to arrive at internationally accepted in-
tervention levels based upon an overall “optimisation” that includes all relevant protection at-
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tributes, because differences between countries at the cultural, political and development level 
might result in quite different weighting of the different attributes. 
(ad 5) The observation that the use of dose limits as intervention levels is fully in accordance with 
the principles of intervention if all relevant factors have been included in the decision-making 
process seems to neglect that weighing the different attributes in an overall optimisation (de-
cision-making) process might result in levels of intervention, which are higher than the gen-
erically optimised intervention levels, not by default lower. Furthermore, the argument that it 
is reasonable for the affected population to demand the same standard of (radiation) protec-
tion as the rest of the population, i.e. that the dose limits for practices should apply also in ac-
cident situations, neglects that after a severe accident like Chernobyl this goal might not at all 
be feasible as there will be bounds to the resources a society may be willing, or able, to com-
mit to intervention to protect the public. Additionally, it would seem rather strange if a na-
tional authority should place much more effort and resources into avoiding a radiation in-
duced cancer as it does into avoiding cancers from other causes. 
(ad 6) The issue on stakeholder involvement should be seen in the larger context of a democratic de-
cision-making process in which all bodies most directly concerned would have a role to play. 
The signals from the ICRP in developing their new recommendations indicate that the Com-
mission in future considers the possibility of involving stakeholders in the process of optimi-
sation in determining, or negotiating, the best level of protection in the circumstances [10]. 
However, it still is to be decided if and how the new ICRP recommendations will deal with 
this degree of societal process. The question therefore remains if and how stakeholders would 
be involved in the development of standards to be used in, e.g., post accident management. 
The consequences of integrating societal aspects into the radiological protection framework 
would in fact mean that the ICRP would enter the field of decision-making, which appears to 
be wrong as the radiation protection community has no mandate to make societal decisions as 
already mentioned. An often overlooked and maybe forgotten issue is the fact that the radiati-
on protection community itself has a role as stakeholder within the larger decision-making 
process. As such, the radiation protection community has a natural obligation to give advice 
and guidance on radiation protection matters on a scientific basis. Equally important, the ra-
diation protection community also has the obligation to object if protective measures were to 
be introduced as mainly radiation protection measures when it is obvious that they are not. 
From past experience it is evident that a methodology is needed in which all relevant protection at-
tributes can be included in the decision-making process to reach a final (optimised) decision on coun-
termeasures in post accident management. During more than a decade a number of research projects 
have been conducted on the role of socio-psychological factors in the implementation of protective 
actions in the late phase of an accident, but no satisfactory instrument have emerged from these re-
search programs as to how radiological and non-radiological attributes can be weighed and combined 
to achieve an optimised protection of the populations affected. Obviously, further research on these 
issues is necessary before only a contour of a solution can be seen. 
Any revised system of public radiation protection in a nuclear or radiological emergency must 
have a sound technical basis and be understandable, explainable and acceptable to the public and the 
decision-makers. Therefore, a common language explanation should be developed for the public and 
public officials that clearly state the risks of radiation exposure and what actions are appropriate and 
inappropriate, and what is “safe”. The concepts of “safe” and “return to normality” should be devel-
oped together with intervention criteria, disengaged from the linear non-threshold risk hypothesis, as 
‘safe’ easily can be in accordance with ‘non-zero risk’. One practicable way could be the use of the 
concept “no observable adverse radiation induced health effects to be expected”. 
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